Kavanaugh bill in NY state assembly would make ballots easier to read and use

Add your comments to a posting on the web site for WNYC's radio show, "It's a Free Country," that presents a proposed redesign for the New York ballot.

The Brennan Center for Justice worked with Design for Democracy and the Usability in Civic Life project to develop an updated best practice ballot design that takes into account the particularities of voting in New York state.

On the show, which aired on June 9, 2011, New York state assemblyman Brian Kavanaugh and Larry Norden of the Brennan Center for Justice discuss how important design is to successful voting and elections. On the show, Larry runs through the proposed design improvements and why they'll make a difference. There are images of a redesigned ballot on the site, as well, and the show invites your comments.

New York voters have had a rough time transitioning from the mechanical lever machines they used to vote for 50 years to a new, paper-based optical scan voting system in the fall of 2010. Ballot design issues have a ripple effect. They frustrate voters, confuse election workers, and can make recounts complicated. All voters are affected by poor ballot design. We urge New York to pass the Kavanaugh bill. 

Hear the show and comment here: http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/jun/09/designing-clearer-ballot/ 

Why is it so hard to produce a usable, well-designed ballot?

This form changed the world.

Miami-Dade presidential ballot from 2000, the "butterfly ballot"

The picture is of the so-called "butterfly ballot" from Miami-Dade County from the presidential election in 2000. It is called a "butterfly ballot" because of how the candidates for this office flow over onto the second page of a two-page spread. The designer of this  punch card ballot wanted to make the type large enough for her overwhelmingly older voting constituency. This caused the contest to flow to two pages. That caused the candidates to interlace across the two-page spread. The holes are meant for every other one to the left or every other one to the right. There are horizontal rules to call out the candidate pairs and arrows to point to the holes. If you use trifocals, and you're in a garage with bad lighting, or a high school gym where there's a lot of glare on the page, how might the alignment go for you? Also, it isn't hard to imagine a voter poking the first hole for the first candidate on the left. Then you must poke the second hole for the second candidate - right?

This intentional-but-ill-informed design caused people to vote in ways they had not intended. It caused enough voters to make mistakes that it changed the outcome of a federal election. Which, because this election happened in the US and it was to elect the president, changed the world. This is not unlike the butterfly of the Chaos Theory.



Democracy is a design problem

Whenever I tell people that I work in voting and election design, I get two questions. The first is, So, is there money to be made there? (No.) The second question is, Why is this so complicated?

The people who ask the second question usually have an answer to offer me, already. The solution, they say, is that there should be one voting system for the whole country. This would impose consistency that could be supported with standards, testing, and enforcement. But it isn't that simple.

By tradition, running elections falls to the states and counties by virtue of the 10th amendment to the US Constituion, which says that anything that isn't covered in the Constitution falls to the people. It is considered a "states' rights" issue. All the Constitution says about elections is that there will be such to elect people to offices. Later amendments say who can vote (15th - barring discrimination based on race or color; 19th - womens' suffrage; 24th - eliminating the requirement to have paid income taxes; 26th - establishing 18 years as the legal voting age). Nothing says anything about who determines what system to use. It falls to the states.

The multiplicity of voting systems is just one tiny slice of this wicked problem. As with other design problems, there are constraints. In the case of ballot design, there are several that interact: 

• Voting technology is a moving target, so standards and best practices always lag. 

• Election management systems are reprehensibly difficult to use. EMSs, into which databases of candidate filings and questions or measures must be poured to make ballots are so difficult that many county election officials just send their databases in to their voting system vendors to do the ballot layouts for them. 

• Design specifications and language for instructions are embedded in county and state election legislation. Type font, weight, and size, grid, and position of instructions are often specified in state election code. Election regulations also often include the exact wording of instructions. It's not uncommon for the instructions to have been written generations ago, in negative, threatening, passive voice. 

• Election directors are excellent public administrators but they're not trained designers. In most of the 3,000 or so counties in the US, the people who run elections are county clerks or registrars who handle vital records such as birth certificates. Most are women, who, on average have held that job for 20 years. They usually are not tech savants, but they don't fear tech, either. They are busy, burdened, and budgetless. Elections have become more and more complicated to administer. Even if they could use InDesign to lay out their ballots, they're not trained designers. For many, a "usable" ballot is one that can be counted accurately by the voting system. And they want to keep costs as low as possible. Printing, mailing, upgrades, bug fixing, translations, storage -- all this costs money. 

• Ballot templates are issued at the state level. It is typical for the secretary of state, as the head of elections, to issue what's called a "ballot template" for state and federal elections. These also come from people who aren't trained designers and don't take into account the things that can happen when county and municipal contests are added to the ballot. They might not make room for multiple languages. They rarely put ballots through usability testing before live testing on Election Day. 

• Municipal and county districts overlap to create what are called "ballot styles." For example, there are places in Washington State where you could possibly have a unique ballot. There -- as in many voting jurisdictions throughout the US -- many lower level contests are included in the ballot, from school board to cemetery commission. The boundaries for those districts have been drawn in dozens of different ways. The right combination could draw a circle around your house. And yet, the county election official must ensure that you get to vote on exactly the contests you are entitled to. For this reason, some counties end up generating hundreds of ballot styles as different levels of districts overlap.

Poor ballot design affects the outcome of elections

When ballots are badly designed, voters get frustrated. People lose confidence in elections. Supporting elections on Election Day becomes difficult for poll workers.

All voters are affected by poor ballot designs. Older voters, first time voters, some minorities, and voters who have less education are very likely to make mistakes that prevent them from voting as they intend. Even white, wealthy, educated voters make mistakes on ballots. That's what happened in 2000. 

Although the butterfly ballot became the emblem for bad ballot design, we continue to see ballot design problems, both in paper ballots and on electronic touch screen systems. Technology has introduced more design problems. It has not solved them.


Voting: the 233-year-old design problem
There are best practice guidelines, commissioned by the US Election Assistance Commission from AIGA's Design for Democracy project, that are evidence-based. Voting system manufacturers are gradually supporting more and more of the guidelines, as local election officials demand it. States are updating election code to loosen design requirements. Local election officials embrace these changes. Although change can be difficult, these particular changes can make the jobs of local election officials easier because the voter's franchise is more likely to be protected with every design improvement.

Design can change the world. This is our superpower. We can affect the accuracy and accessibility of elections. But there aren't nearly enough people who are interested in civic design. Join the movement at the most important panel in the Free World, at South by Southwest in Austin on Monday, March 14 at 3:30 Central time. (Follow #uxvote on Twitter.) There we'll have on hand Dana Debeauvoir, county clerk from Travis County, Texas with Ric Grefe, the executive director of AIGA and the Design for Democracy project, along with Larry Norden, a civil rights lawyer and senior counsel for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU. I'll be moderating. See you there. And at poll worker training for the next election.

Testing ballots: Real names or fictional? Direct how to vote or not?

How do you design a study to learn about ballot and voting system usability without doing the research during an election? The ideal situation would be to watch over voters’ shoulders on Election Day. But because we prize voting privately in the United States, observing voting on Election Day just is not an option. What’s a researcher to do?

It’s a challenging research situation.

What ballot should be used in the study? Should you use a real ballot from a recent election? What are the tradeoffs there? Next, you have to set up a situation that is similar to Election Day but isn’t. Turns out that making a study a lot like Election Day doesn’t really work for research.


Why researchers use constructed ballots with fictional names

There's a lot of research about whether fictional names are okay in voting studies, particularly by the people at Rice University in the ACCURATE project. They found that fictional names are okay as long as they're realistic. The NIST standard ballot for certification testing uses fictional names. Many researchers have picked up that ballot (or subsets of it) to use in their research.

When you use real names locally, it can be jarring if the design or the format looks different from what participants are expecting, and you instantly have artifacts from that. If there's one thing that does not look like the ballot they used, then voters notice and it's an instant distraction. So why not make the whole thing up?

Most researchers have decided not to use a real ballot from a recent election with. Why not? Using a constructed ballot, with fictional contests, names, and amendments or questions:

• avoids asking people to vote in a contest where they might have their own opinions, or where it asks them to reveal their political preferences
  
  
• levels playing field across levels of political interest
  
  
• allows constructing a ballot that can be used to test different usability issues in types of contests or tasks

Why researchers tell participants how to vote

Now, why not let study participants vote the way they want to? Why give them a slate to vote or task scenarios to work from?

In usability tests, researchers often ask participants to carry out pre-determined scenarios. Sometimes this is done to measure specific behavior, sometimes to make sure certain things are tested, sometimes to make sure that the facilitator is ready for the next expected thing. Part of the art of conducting a usability study is knowing when to let participants do what they want to do and knowing when to go back to the test design. (In the ideal world, what the participant wants to do and what you want them to do are the same thing.) Researchers in the elections space make this decision consciously and deliberately to make sure that they can collect the data measures that will prove (or not) a hypothesis.

Instructed voting makes it possible to evaluate error rates without directly observing the participant voting. People who study how people use other kinds of technology try to instrument the system to capture test data or observe directly. These things are difficult to do with voting systems. So, instructed voting versus "just vote as you might" asks the participants to be thoughtfully accurate, and not just randomly mark the ballot.


The special challenges of voting research

Researching how people interact with most technology, a researcher can go into the field, hang around where the person is doing what they want to do and ask questions. Election Day is not the time for that. Most voting research requires that the number of variables be limited and those that remain are controlled.
So far, researchers have found that using the NIST standard ballots and directed tasks is the best way to manage that.

-- By Whitney Quesenbery and Dana Chisnell